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Abstract 
 
 Cybersecurity governance is a critical issue for 
organizations engaged in a constant struggle to protect 
their data, brand, customers, and other assets from 
malignant actors. The nature of what constitutes 
successful cybersecurity practices and governance, 
however, is not yet clear, in part because an 
appropriate measure for cybersecurity success is not 
likely to be singular or simple.  In this qualitative study, 
we explore perspectives of cybersecurity success 
through interviews representing various technical and 
non-technical roles across a variety of organizations, 
then provide a preliminary framework for 
understanding dimensions of cybersecurity success 
(financial, information integrity, operational, and 
reputational) as well as their associated knowledge 
domains and alignments.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 Cybersecurity incident response has become a 
nearly ubiquitous concern as attacks and breaches have 
struck organizations across business, not-for-profit, and 
governmental sectors. Indeed, the cost of cybercrime is 
estimated to reach $2 trillion dollars by 2019; and 
despite the increasing its severity, only 38% of 
companies reported in a survey that they were prepared 
to respond effectively to breaches and attacks 
(https://securityintelligence.com/20-eye-opening-
cybercrime-statistics/). Organizations seeking to 
address such cybersecurity threats must develop 
governance policies which provide a goal framework 
for both technological and human systems, including 
managing the human performance and knowledge 
resources of the firm [1]. A significant challenge to such 
a framework is a lack of understanding of what 
constitutes success in the cybersecurity domain, 
especially beyond the information system itself. This 
understanding is needed to structure the knowledge 
required to inform cybersecurity governance policies 
that will support these broad forms of success. Once 
these areas are better understood, they can enact a 
comprehensive cybersecurity governance program, 
which we define as “the sum total of an organization’s 
efforts to protect its digital assets from unauthorized 
access and control, and by extension, protect further 
assets (e.g., people, intellectual property, finances) 
which could be compromised by unauthorized access.” 
 In contrast to the popular adage, both cybersecurity 
success and failure “have many fathers”. In other 
words, a full understanding of what constitutes 
cybersecurity success for organizations is not likely to 
be singular or simple, reflecting the multiple 
components involved in governance systems (e.g., 
technology, decision structure, human behavior) as well 
as the variety of precipitating events and damages 
associated with data breaches (defined as 
“unauthorized access to sensitive, protected, or 
confidential data resulting in the compromise or 
potential compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the affected data” [2]. To this point, less 
than half of the reported data security breaches (48%) 
result from actual attacks by malicious agents; most 
such breaches are caused more by human errors and 
system failures [3]. With some exceptions, attempts to 
address cybersecurity breaches have generally relied 
upon technological solutions designed to scan incoming 
data for potential issues. However, organizational 
psychologists have recently begun to focus on the 
human psychosocial elements of cybersecurity, and 
particularly on the individual, team, and organizational 
factors that facilitate successful responses to cyber 
breaches.  Because cybersecurity affects nearly every 
person and every role in an organization’s structure, 
each with a perspective grounded in distinct 
knowledge, such a focus means identifying the 
collective processes and emergent states that contribute 
to more effective information sharing and application to 
what are often novel forms of attacks [1, 4, 5]. 
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 Successful cybersecurity practice therefore 
requires alignment of knowledge among various 
individuals, roles and systems, such that a knowledge 
schema is formed at the organization level. To 
understand this cybersecurity-focused knowledge 
schema, we lean on team cognition research [6-8] 
which provides frameworks describing knowledge 
structure and content, such as degree of sharedness and 
related dimensions [9].   
This study explores what constitutes cybersecurity 
success in organizations, in the perspective of 
organizational actors, through a qualitative inquiry 
using grounded theory method, including review of 
related literature, interviews with key informants, and 
thematic coding. We build upon the rich and established 
research literature on information systems (IS) success 
[10, 11], where proposed frameworks and empirically-
tested constructs have focused on the data system itself. 
Cybersecurity, however, is a more complex endeavor 
going beyond technologies to also include people 
across varying roles within an organizational structure, 
and related processes that influence governance 
operation. Consequently, we propose that the 
appropriate definition and measure for cybersecurity 
success is not singular, but is tightly interrelated with 
multiple organizational structures, goals, processes and 
actors. Thus, the primary research questions for this 
study are: 
1. How do organizations conceptualize and measure 
their cybersecurity governance effectiveness? 
2. How do such perspectives on cybersecurity success 
differ across organization level and roles? 
 Once success is defined, effective cybersecurity 
governance is enacted through the content and structure 
of knowledge, including risk perspectives, held by the 
variety of internal and external stakeholders across 
roles and levels. These include board members exposed 
to risk and liability, executives monitoring financial 
returns, technical staff protecting hardware and 
software resources, middle managers ensuring 
continuity of their functional operations, and customers 
concerned with identity theft. Therefore, as a secondary 
focus, in this study we also investigate the content 
domains and alignment structure of knowledge 
associated with cybersecurity success.   
3. What knowledge domains and alignments are 
relevant to cybersecurity success?  
 We investigate and further develop these questions 
through interviews with practitioners who fulfill varied 
roles across multiple levels of a diverse set of 
organizations in several industry sectors, informing our 
understanding of effective cybersecurity practices, 
measures, and governance. We then offer the findings 
from this qualitative approach as a preliminary 
framework for understanding cybersecurity success.  
 
2. Extant Theory 
 To better understand what constitutes cybersecurity 
success, we review the extant literature in this area. 
2.1 Cybersecurity Success 
 The research literature suggests that IS project 
performance consists of two distinct dimensions: 
process performance and product performance [12-14]. 
Process performance has to do with the execution of the 
project and is typically measured by on-time/ on-budget 
project completion, user participation, and team 
member satisfaction and morale [13, 15, 16]. Product 
performance has to do with the actual information 
system developed, including system quality, 
functionality, impact, and user satisfaction with the 
system. Based on these studies and DeLone and 
McLean’s [11] updated IS Success Model,  our 
conceptualization and interview questions includes 
several measures of IS project success: on-time 
completion, within-budget completion, system 
costs/effort, meeting system requirements, system 
quality, user satisfaction, project team satisfaction, 
system use, and net system benefits. 
 In their seminal paper [10] and follow up 10-year 
review [11], DeLone and McLean [11] suggested 
measures of system success, including system quality, 
information quality, service quality, system use, user 
satisfaction, individual impact and organizational 
impact [10, 11]. This IS Success Model reports on the 
numerous measures that have been studied under each 
of these success dimensions.  Organizational impact 
measures include such measures as improved 
organizational productivity, operating cost reductions, 
sales growth and increased profits.  These measures can 
serve as a guide to identify potential outcomes of 
cybersecurity success.   
 The present study builds upon this body of research 
in IS success in several ways. First, cybersecurity is not 
a technological system per se, but an ongoing activity 
meant to protect not just systems and information, but 
also financial concerns, privacy, reputation, operations, 
processes and organizational outcomes. As such, it is a 
broader and more complex construct to define. Second, 
consistent with the standards set forth by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [17] we 
view cybersecurity success as a two-phase endeavor: 
(1) Pre-Incident – aimed at managing risk and 
preventing breaches. This phase encompasses three 
NIST functions: Identify, Protect and Detect; and (2) 
Post-Incident – aimed at the expedient and effective 
restoration of normal operations. This phase 
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encompasses the other two NIST functions: Respond 
and Recover. Therefore, cybersecurity success must 
account for both, the extent to which breaches are 
prevented and the timely recovery of normal 
organizational systems and functions. 
2.2 Shared Knowledge in Cybersecurity 
 While much has been written about cybersecurity 
practices, risk and governance, very little research has 
explored how the domain knowledge and its structural 
alignment across organizational members may 
influence risk exposure and potential business losses. 
Cybersecurity-related knowledge may be held 
differentially across organizational roles and levels; for 
instance, members of the information security team 
may share the basics of security protocols with product-
line managers, but both roles would also have 
differentiated, unshared knowledge. Without an 
appropriate sharing of knowledge, decisions would be 
made in isolation, such as when cybersecurity 
protection resources are budgeted only to safeguard 
technical assets without regard for other perspectives. 
However, technical breaches, such as those suffered in 
recent years at the City of Baltimore, Starwood, Target 
and Sony, demonstrate that companies must account for 
risk of legal liability and loss of business value that 
were previously unimaginable. We argue that 
understanding the manner in which knowledge about 
cybersecurity is shared across organizational levels and 
entities is necessary to mitigate its associated risks and 
to deal more effectively with breaches when they occur. 
Thus, our research is designed to capture viewpoints 
which may reveal multiple perspectives on what 
constitutes cybersecurity success. 
 Cybersecurity incident response maturity models 
have generally focused on both the technical and 
individual capacities of in the incident response 
systems. For example, the National Cyber Security 
Centre in the Netherlands identified 5 areas of cyber 
security incident response maturity:  foundation, tools, 
processes, organizational and human [18]. The 
foundation element refers to the creation and structural 
establishment of the incident response system.  Tools 
and processes refer respectively to the automation and 
the technological infrastructure supporting incident 
response and the establishment of formal core services 
of the incident response system.  The organizational 
element refers to formal governance structures guiding 
incident response. Finally, the human element refers to 
the incident responder’s knowledge, skills and abilities.  
 Tetrick and colleagues [1] argued that this and 
similar incident response models fail to capture the key 
elements related to social functioning in incident 
response collectives.  Along this line, Zaccaro and 
colleagues [5] noted that cybersecurity incident 
response typically entails collective knowledge work in 
which multiple analysts think and work together to 
make sense of incoming incidents and develop 
remediation solutions.  Accordingly, Tetrick et al [1] 
specified social maturity as another key element in 
incident response models. They defined such maturity 
as the degree to which incident response teams and 
multiteam systems possess “the capacity to collaborate 
well together in accomplishing [their] mission [and] to 
develop an effective synergy among…members” (p. 
48).   
  The effective sharing of information among 
cybersecurity stakeholders represents a critical element 
of incident response social maturity [5]. Information 
sharing about cyber incidents occurs not only within 
members of an incident response team, but also with 
other teams within a multi-team incident response 
system [see 4 for a description of such systems], as well 
as with teams in other partnering organizations.  The 
speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of cyber incident 
remediation depends heavily on the quality of such 
information sharing and subsequent response 
coordination.  In turn, information sharing quality is 
largely a function of the shared knowledge structures 
and networks established to guide and regulate such 
activities during incident response.  As studies have 
shown [19], the extent and manner in which team 
members share knowledge has a strong impact on 
project success.  
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Qualitative Inquiry and Grounded Theory 
Method  
 Given the incomplete understanding and lack of a 
widely accepted model of cybersecurity success, we 
adopted grounded theory method, widely used in IS 
research [20, 21], to qualitatively explore the 
parameters of the success construct within its natural 
contexts, interviewing key informants and comparing 
their responses to discern themes and distinctions. 
Consistent with this method, we developed our basic 
interview questions from existing literature [22, 23]. 
We immersed ourselves in the extant knowledge of 
cybersecurity success, we read numerous secondary 
sources including scholarly works (e.g., ethnographies), 
business press, trade publications, and traditional media 
accounts. We then developed an initial coding scheme 
through open coding of the first few interview 
transcriptions aimed at uncovering general recurring 
themes of interest [24]. We then used the resulting 
themes once more, case by case, to contrast similarities 
and differences across roles and organizations [25], 
with consensus from three of the researchers involved 
in this study. We then analyzed the relationship among 
these themes.  
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 This approach enabled us “to uncover and 
understand what lies behind any phenomenon about 
which little is yet known” and “gain novel and fresh 
slants” that build on existing theory [23, p.19]. We used 
a parallel processing approach to apply a key tenet of 
Grounded Theory – the iteration among new data, early 
data and existing research [26]. We then iterated 
informal and formal qualitative analyses with multiple 
raters, employing hand coding and software-supported 
analysis (i.e., NVivo©). Finally, we discussed the 
resulting themes and factors within our research team. 
3.2 Sample 
 We interviewed a total of 17 experienced 
practitioners, drawn through a modified convenience 
sample technique which utilized cold calls and existing 
connections of the authors to contact a diverse array of 
organizations. The authors also developed connections 
through speaking at conferences and panels on 
cybersecurity-related topics. To gain perspectives of the 
variety of organizational roles who are jointly 
responsible for the cybersecurity of the organization, 
we targeted both technical and nontechnical 
interviewees across a variety of roles and organizational 
levels, including executives, members of boards of 
directors, managers, and line staff in organizations 
spanning several economic sectors, including 
insurance, consulting, healthcare, energy, and higher 
education. Our study sample is summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1. Study Sample 
Participant 
Role 
Organization Type 
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Board 2  1  3 
Legal 1    1 
Audit 1    1 
CIO   1  1 
CISO 1  1  2 
Cybersecurity Specialist 1 1 1 5 8 
Analyst    1 1 
Total 6 1 4 6 17 
 
 All interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
resulting in over 120,000 words and 240 pages of 
material. The study reported in this paper is based on a 
preliminary analysis of these interviews by two of the 
three authors, who also conducted the interviews, and 
a separate in-depth analysis of the first 9 interviews by 
the remaining author and two research assistants.  
3.3 Interview Protocol  
 The semi-structured interview protocol consisted 
of open-ended questions focusing on a set of related 
themes. The most relevant questions were the following 
3 categories: 
(1) conceptualization of cybersecurity success (e.g., 
What ends does your organization seek from your 
cybersecurity program?)  
 (2) classification of cybersecurity breach severity (e.g., 
Please give examples of what you consider to be a (i) 
critical; (ii) serious; (iii) minor cyber event. What 
factors lead you to classify these events?); and 
 (3) extent of organizational knowledge on pre-incident 
(identify, protect and detect) and post-incident 
(response and recover) phases of the NIST framework. 
 
During the interviews we focused participants on  
contrasting what they knew, what others knew, and 
what colleagues should know about cybersecurity 
governance. Given the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews, interviewers were free to explore interesting 
themes in more detail and were not required to ask 
every question in the protocol. 
3.4 Analysis  
 Following Miles and Huberman [27] and Strauss 
and Corbin [23], our literature review and research 
questions played a sensitizing role, suggesting the a 
priori constructs. Following the initial set of interviews, 
the two authors who conducted the interviews recorded 
their impressions, including development of an initial 
framework of cybersecurity success. In keeping with 
principles of qualitative inquiry, our analysis granted 
preliminary validity to all dimensions of cybersecurity 
success revealed in the interview process, as long as 
they increased the parameters of the construct. The 
frequency with which dimensions were mentioned was 
noted, although this did not necessarily further validate 
the dimension’s utility.  We then compared coding with 
the goal of attaining what Kvale terms “dialogical 
intersubjectivity,” [28, p.154] a form of reliability via 
discussion regarding complex phenomena. Two 
authors, who conducted the interviews, pulled 
preliminary themes from the interviews. The third 
author and two research assistants, none of whom 
participated in the interviews, conducted separate 
coding and thematic analysis of the data by using 
NVivo© software. As a final step, the first two authors 
reviewed and refined the coded themes, identifying 
relations among them. 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Cybersecurity Success 
Page 4286
 Our findings provided strong evidence that there 
are multiple dimensions of cybersecurity success which 
reflect the desire to achieve stable fulfillment of 
organizational goals, measured as size, depth, scope, or 
duration in one or more of these aspects of the system: 
financial, reputational, operational, and information 
integrity. This is consistent with prior arguments from 
DeLone & McLean [10, 11] and Jennex et al. [29]. 
These dimensions of cybersecurity success often 
seemed to fit with the strategic goals of their particular 
industry, and also the role of the person interviewed, 
with some overlap across these perspectives. This can 
be seen in the frequency that the dimensions were 
mentioned in the interviews: (1) financial impact (15 
interviews, 29 references); (2) system integrity/ 
information protection (14 interviews, 33 references); 
(3) operational continuity or disruption (11 interviews, 
21 references); (4) organizational reputation (12 
interviews, 31 references); and (5) temporal or 
quantitative extent of a cybersecurity intrusion (7 
interviews, 9 references). Next, we discuss these key 
dimensions, listed in Table 2, in more detail, and also 
refer to additional important success indicators 
mentioned by our interviewees, such as regulatory 
compliance, health outcomes, intellectual property, and 
others. 
 
Table 2. Cybersecurity Success Dimensions 
Key Dimensions 
(Impact Areas) 
Impact Size, Scope, Temporality 
Examples 
Financial Impact 
Magnitude of revenue protection & 
cost avoidance; impact on earnings 
System Integrity & 
Information Protection 
Number and importance of personal 
records exposed to theft 
Operational Continuity 
or Disruption 
Extent and duration of disruption; 
Healthcare mortality 
Organizational 
Reputation 
Extent and duration of reputational 
damage 
 
4.1.1 Financial 
 For private enterprises and many not-for-profit 
organizations, cybersecurity effectiveness was 
evaluated in terms of revenue protection and/or cost 
avoidance at some point in the sequence of 
organizational factors that comprise their value chains 
[30].  Even in not-for-profit organizations, financial 
considerations were important in providing and 
sustaining resources, in ultimate pursuit of stakeholder 
fulfillment [31]. For publicly traded companies this 
financial impact extended to the influence of 
cybersecurity incidents on stock price and shareholder 
value. Thus, when considering a given point in time, 
most success measures may have an impact, at least 
indirectly, on the financial bottom line, as this 
participant’s comment illustrates: “You know if I'm a 
pharma company then ... if somebody steals the secret 
formula ... that is a major loss. Or if it's a movie studio 
somebody … gets an early copy of the release … so in 
most cases it's a downstream financial loss.” 
 In this case, information integrity is compromised 
(i.e. intellectual property is stolen), which will result in 
lost revenue, ultimately limiting the ability of the 
organization to fulfill its mission. 
 Also, organizations that have experienced personal 
information breaches may pay out a per-person fee for 
credit monitoring.  The impact of breaches, such as 
denial of service attacks or others with operational 
disruptions translate into lost revenues.  Reputational 
damage (discussed below) can also be assessed by its 
impact on customer loyalty and ultimately by lost sales. 
Additionally, cybersecurity incidents often have 
associated costs of remediation (e.g., ransom payment) 
and recovery.  Therefore, the overall measure of success 
is the avoidance of revenue loss plus response and 
recovery expenses.  
 It might be tempting to conclude that every factor 
and dimension related to cybersecurity success are 
subservient to, or at least leading to, the organization’s 
financial outcomes. However, this view may fail to 
consider the important temporal, human and strategic 
dimensions. Financial outcomes often lag behind 
cybersecurity decisions and actions made at a given 
point in time. For instance, cybersecurity investments 
made at a given time might have differential financial 
outcomes later. An effective solution to a cybersecurity 
issue may require an investment that sacrifices shorter-
term financials for longer-term viability.  
 The personal stake of cybersecurity governance 
decision-makers in terms of protecting their managerial 
or board positions, may not align directly with optimal 
financial outcomes. Additionally, satisfying 
stakeholders or achieving an organization’s mission 
may supersede optimal financial decisions, especially 
for not-for-profits or government agencies. Our 
interviewees supported the need to look beyond 
financial considerations when defining cybersecurity 
success, as explained below.  
4.1.2 System Integrity & Information Protection 
 The earliest and most publicized cybersecurity 
incidents have involved the theft of personal 
information, especially credit card data (identity theft). 
Examples include Marriott International, Target, 
Anthem, Equifax, Facebook, the City of Baltimore’s 
ransomware attack, and the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM). These cybersecurity events 
gained prominence for the sheer volume of records 
(millions) that were compromised.  Large companies 
and/or their cyber insurance companies have incurred 
costs per compromised record, amounting to millions of 
dollars in remediation costs. As a result, the corporate 
risk management spotlight has often been focused on 
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the protection of personal information of customers and 
employees.   
 Personal information protection has been further 
heightened by the recent rollout of the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
with its massive fine potential for non-compliance. 
Naturally, publicized data breaches can impact 
customer trust and future purchases; resulting in further 
revenue loss.  For example, one participant noted that 
“cybersecurity integrity is certainly paramount … what 
made that major was because of the information access 
to everything else. … privacy involves the third or 
fourth on our list of importance.”   
4.1.3 Operational Continuity or Disruption 
 One important goal of a cybersecurity governance 
program is to maintain continuity of business 
operations.  Denial of service attacks, ransomware 
incidents and viruses like WannaCry are examples of 
cyberattacks meant to disrupt or shut down 
organizational operations.  These are among the more 
devastating cybersecurity incidents resulting in 
significant revenue loss and in the case of healthcare 
systems, the potential loss of life, as a participant 
articulated: “I would say a critical event would be an 
intrusion into an operating plan or an operating system 
and losing control of that for some period of 
time…completely disrupting a bank or insurance 
company, and actually disrupting their operations, is a 
much more serious event.”   
 Another participant also noted how dramatic losing 
operational control can be: “A critical event would be 
an intrusion into an operating plan or an operating 
system and losing control of that for some period of 
time. … to take Shell or Exxon or one of those guys, the 
deepwater platforms, one of them produces 200,000 
barrels a day of oil. If you lost control of that because 
somebody hacked into your system, your skater system 
and your control system, and you've lost control of that. 
That would be a major event.”  
 Thus, one of the major dimensions of an effective 
cybersecurity program is avoiding or limiting any 
disruption to operations, as exemplified by this 
comment from an informant: “If you have some sort of 
type of system outage that we have seen that have 
impacted some airlines where they've had significant 
outages where there were several clients that had issues 
arising from the Mirai botnet… that impacted their 
organization where they did quite a bit of business 
online … where clients weren’t able to access the sites 
and they ended up incurring quite a bit of expense with 
it as well as a loss of income.” 
4.1.4 Organizational Reputation 
 Many senior executives and board members worry 
most about the risk of reputational damage resulting 
from a publicly reported cybersecurity attack that might 
result in the theft of personal information or reveal 
damaging internal communications, as this participant 
comment illustrates: “the best outcome is never have 
anything embarrassing happen.”  This seems to be a 
most salient theme, particularly at higher levels of the 
organization, as this comment illustrates: “One is 
where information is pulled out and then that breach is 
made public so that somebody not only pulls 
information out which is damaging enough or money 
out, but they actually demonstrate in public that they've 
done it. And then there's an impact on your brand 
potentially.”  
 Another participant also noted that “as a security 
person I didn’t care about denial of service, I would 
categorize it as minor. But for an insurance carrier, 
that would be major because, for example, imagine the 
business interruption, the business impact and effect on 
your insurance policy if delta.com got knocked offline”. 
 Reputational or brand damage can result in loss of 
customer trust, purchases and loyalty. Furthermore, 
these impacts can be longer lasting than a disruption in 
operations that has a discrete time limitation, as this 
comment about the Sony breaches illustrates: “the Sony 
attack from a couple of years ago; part of the novelty 
there is that the threat … specifically wanted to target 
e-mail communications of the top leadership to bear. 
They say they stole a lot of other information too. But 
part of what they went after was e-mails where they 
found company executives talking negatively about 
Hollywood stars.” On the flip side, positive 
cybersecurity performance may enhance a company’s 
image as a trusted partner dedicated to protecting 
customer information and privacy.   
4.1.5 Other Important Success Measures 
 Our participants mentioned additional measures and 
indicators of success. Regulatory compliance was 
another frequently mentioned success issue. As one 
board member put it: “there's a whole bunch of 
regulatory … things that can create some huge 
problems.” Organizations are concerned about large 
government fines related to failure to protect personal 
information or failure to report breaches that might 
impact an organization’s operational and/or financial 
performance materially. The large fines being meted 
out by the European Union under the new General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) are emerging as a 
significant issue. Thus, avoiding such fines is a 
meaningful success measure. Potential SEC fines for 
misleading filings represent both unwanted costs and 
reputational damage. One senior executive stated that  
“we have to be very careful … because of SEC filings.  
There are certain things, depending on how much they 
cost and the impact as defined by the SEC and it affects 
your ratings so companies have to be sure that, if they 
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classify an attack … adjusting their 10K to reflect the 
cost of those systems (breaches).”   
 Similarly, organizations want to avoid the overhead 
costs and productivity loss associated with 
governmental compliance audits.  Regulatory issues 
can extend the impact of a cybersecurity breach by 
adding costs and/or reputational damage to other 
foundational impacts. Good cybersecurity governance 
reduces financial and reputational risks by avoiding 
regulatory action. 
 Interestingly, some cybersecurity success measures 
are industry specific. For example, quality of care and 
mortality metrics are critical in the healthcare industry. 
Environmental impacts are key to success in the oil and 
gas industry. One representative of the oil and gas 
industry stated: “But if something happened and it 
caused an oil spill, that would be huge.” 
 Responses from board members and executives are 
more representative of enterprise success measures. For 
example, an important measure for senior managers is 
intellectual property protection, a significant 
competitive advantage issue.  As one respondent put it: 
“(the theft of) intellectual property … is the most 
dangerous to our organizations and organizations have 
not figured out what to do with that.” 
 Finally, it is also important to acknowledge that 
individuals at all levels of the organization identified 
success measures that may be in conflict with enterprise 
cybersecurity success measures. Therefore, those 
individuals may take cybersecurity actions that are not 
in the best interest of the organization as a whole.  Job 
preservation is a prime example. IT managers and/or 
executives may choose not to disclose serious breaches 
for fear of termination.  As documented in the business 
press, multiple Chief Information Security Officers, 
Chief Information Officers and Chief Executive 
Officers have lost their jobs due to serious cybersecurity 
intrusions. Board of Directors’ satisfaction with an 
organizational cybersecurity governance program is an 
important factor in managerial job security. For 
example, one board member commented that 
management will disclose cybersecurity breaches to the 
board only when approved by legal counsel. Most 
companies will have thresholds or committees to decide 
when to disclose particular information to the board. 
4.2 Incident Severity 
 In order to understand how knowledge alignment 
can affect cybersecurity success, we first had to 
understand how participants classified the severity of 
cybersecurity incidents as either severe, serious, or 
minor.  
Critical Events: were those associated with irreparable 
financial or reputational damage. One participant 
referred to these as “business-ending” events. 
However, most participants were less dramatic, but 
indeed referred to events of broader scope that could 
seriously compromise things like critical infrastructure, 
personal identities, intellectual property and service 
delivery. For example, one participant discussed the 
adverse effects that a breach of hospital patient records 
could have. Another participant commented on the 
irreparable damage that massive breaches of identity in 
organizations can, as this participant comment 
illustrates: “when many federal employees now have 
their fingerprints potentially compromised and that's 
something that cannot be regenerated because it is 
acute and specific. So those people have the possibility 
of having some level of compromise or inability to have 
non-repudiation of their identity for the rest of their 
lives”. 
Serious Events: are somewhat similar in nature to 
critical events, but narrower in scope and with more 
limited reputational and financial impact. There was 
general agreement that these affect individual systems, 
small groups of individuals or single departments, non-
critical infrastructure and non-critical services, among 
other entities.  
Table 3. Cybersecurity Incident Severity 
Examples 
 Incident Severity: Examples from 
Interviews  
 
Minor Serious Critical 
Financial 
Impact 
Ransomware 
attack on a 
limited number 
of computers 
with a small 
financial loss 
relative to 
company size.  
Paycheck 
redirection to a 
malicious actor 
of a large 
group of 
employees 
(hard or non-
repayable 
money loss). 
Theft of a drug 
formula from a 
pharmaceutical 
company that 
reduces ability 
to recoup 
development 
investments.  
Systems 
Integrity & 
Information 
Protection 
An individual’s 
social network 
account hack. 
Starwood, 
Sony, Home 
Depot, Target 
hacks that 
took significant 
financial 
resources to 
recover. 
A lobbyist’s 
phone hack 
when a foreign 
government 
gets access to 
sensitive US 
government 
information. 
Operational 
Continuity or 
Disruption 
DDoS attacks 
(for an IS 
specialist)  
Ukrainian 
power grid in 
summer of 
2015 with no 
human lives 
lost. 
Intrusion of an 
operating 
system of an oil 
and gas 
company, 
losing control 
for a time.  
Organizational 
Reputation 
Change a 
homepage of a 
company’s 
website. 
Customers’ 
payment card 
information, 
social security 
numbers, ID 
breach that a 
company must   
acknowledge.  
Equifax breach 
with non-
recoverable 
reputation loss.  
 
Minor Events: there is some consensus among 
participants that minor events are those that need to be 
Page 4289
addressed, but that they are mostly nuisance issues with 
limited financial or reputational impact, and very 
narrow in scope. Some examples of this include identity 
theft of single individuals, viruses and malware 
affecting one or few users, and minor phishing 
breaches. 
 Interviewees mentioned further examples of 
cybersecurity events of varying severity, from their 
own organizations and references to incidents known 
from the popular press or their own contacts. We 
include some of these examples in Table 3.  
4.3 Knowledge Alignment 
The primary purpose of the present study, and the 
focus of the first two research questions, was to develop 
the construct of cybersecurity success. Once this is 
defined, our third research question can help explore the 
domains and alignment of knowledge among the 
multiple cybersecurity actors and roles, necessary to 
achieve cybersecurity success in organizations. From 
our interviews, we are able to sketch out some 
preliminary findings of interest. One important thing to 
note is that most participants responded to our questions 
from one of three perspectives: what they themselves 
knew; what others in different roles knew; and what 
people should really know. Another interesting finding 
to note is that the NIST Framework is not necessarily 
widely adopted, but when participants discussed 
cybersecurity knowledge areas, a great deal of the 
policies and procedures they mentioned fitted within 
the NIST Framework functional categories, even if not 
classified that way verbatim by them. 
Perhaps the most interesting thing to note is the 
differences in perceptions about knowledge and 
information across roles. For example, participants in 
cybersecurity technical roles were typically confident 
that the critical cybersecurity practices were in place 
and that their organizations were well protected against 
breaches. They tended to rate their knowledge of pre-
incident aspects (i.e., identify, detect, protect) as very 
high and were also confident that policies and 
procedures were in place for effective post-incident 
response and recovery. 
This perspective was not always shared by others 
who were more focused on risk management than on 
specific cybersecurity checklists and policy 
compliance. Middle to upper management respondents 
reported more concern about governance and the 
appropriate level of information sharing with the board. 
Indeed, some of our interviewees noted that 
information sharing cannot be widespread in every 
instance because it can create panic situations, and it 
was necessary to be very careful about which incidents 
to escalate to the upper management or to the governing 
board. One study participant in a cybersecurity 
management role commented: “I would say that the 
number one thing is that the board is happy, and we are 
not having to notify on data breaches over a long period 
of time. That's a beautiful thing for sure. That's a 
number one no data breach is awesome. That doesn't 
mean that they're not happening right?” The same 
participant noted that before even declaring an event as 
a cybersecurity incident, a substantial evaluation and 
discussion was required: “…so it's not necessarily a 
cybersecurity incident, but it could be and we are going 
to report out our next report will be in 30 minutes. Our 
next report might be in an hour. Our next report may be 
in four hours because it's inherently [sic] and we're not 
going to have anything that is really appreciably 
different than the time before. [The report would state:] 
Please do not share this information beyond this group. 
No need to escalate yet. This is confidential as we're 
still in the investigation stages.”  
In some cases, the differentiation of cybersecurity 
knowledge extended beyond the boundaries of the focal 
organization. Our interviewees reported that this 
outsourced knowledge may come through a specialized 
consultant, an estimate for insurance (often according 
to its own set of cybersecurity standards), or an 
interpretation of industry or government guidelines, 
such as in the form of a scorecard. These cases include 
variation in both content of knowledge, in that the 
outsiders bring in new information or perspectives, and 
the knowledge structure of in terms of who holds that 
particular expertise.  
Interestingly, high-level managers discussed the 
importance of communication protocols related to 
cybersecurity incidents, and that it is a matter of 
deciding when to escalate an issue to the board, but a 
board member commented that the flow of information 
from upper management to the board is often controlled 
and filtered by legal counsel, as this comment by a 
board member illustrates: “management filters the 
story to shift the narrative … just to clarify that a little 
bit more which is why the general counsel ultimately 
gets involved is the general counsel typically prepares 
the agenda for the board. And if they don't want to 
speak much then there's five minutes on cybersecurity. 
If you’re going to say something you must rehearse it 
with the general counsel prior go into the board … 
cybersecurity is highly controversial. Therefore, the 
role the general counsel serves as a gatekeeper to 
decide whether or not they will let the board hear the 
information or not.” 
Overall, our preliminary results suggest that people 
in more technical roles within cybersecurity are more 
knowledgeable about pre-incident areas and they tend 
to have confidence in their ability to protect the 
organization, at least publicly. Management is more 
concerned with risk mitigation and effective response 
and recovery plans and may carefully select what 
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knowledge and information is shared with the board. 
The board is more concerned with understanding their 
liability and exposure, and how incidents may impact 
shareholders. 
One more interesting issue emerging from the data 
is about the type of knowledge that needs to be shared. 
The team cognition literature differentiates the various 
team knowledge constructs into durable – i.e., 
knowledge acquired over time, which remains relevant 
over time (e.g., procedures, tools, policies) and fleeting 
– i.e., situational knowledge that is relevant while a 
situation is in progress (e.g., presence awareness, task 
awareness, etc.), which becomes irrelevant when the 
situation passes [32]. In this regard, there seems to be a 
parallel with other domains like in sports and military 
operations, in which teams need to train and learn over 
long periods of time, acquiring durable knowledge to be 
able to perform effectively and efficiently during games 
or operations. Similarly, our data suggests that 
cybersecurity actors need to share substantial amounts 
of durable knowledge during pre-incident phases, but 
then need to share fleeting knowledge during post-
incident phases, in a timely and efficient manner, 
fostering effective situational awareness [33]. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 This study explores the construct of cybersecurity 
success, grounded in a set of qualitative interviews with 
professionals who fulfill varied roles across levels of 
organizations in multiple industry sectors. Our findings 
indicate that cybersecurity success is multifaceted, 
including financial, information integrity, operational, 
and reputational dimensions, each with varying 
relevance to differing organizations and roles. This 
multidimensional view of cybersecurity success is 
important for both research and practical 
considerations. Defining an array of cybersecurity 
success dimensions allows organizations to clarify 
connections of their governance policies and practices 
with specific outcomes meaningful to their line of 
business. Similarly, organizational researchers can use 
such connections to model relationships, build theory, 
and test hypotheses to deepen understanding of 
effective cybersecurity governance.  
 Additionally, we find preliminary evidence that 
knowledge domains related to particular dimensions of 
cybersecurity outcomes are differentially distributed 
across organizational roles and levels. Technical and 
non-technical roles, as well as executive and functional 
managers, hold dissimilar knowledge content. 
However, this knowledge needs to be aligned in terms 
within and across job roles, both in terms of durable and 
situational awareness knowledge of where to turn in the 
case of cybersecurity breaches or threats. Further 
examination, such as through policy-capturing or 
survey research, may help to reveal optimal 
distributions of specific knowledge domains to achieve 
varied forms of cybersecurity success without 
expecting all organizational members to become 
experts in every aspect of cybersecurity.  
 Finally, it is evident that organizations vary in their 
ratings of severity thresholds for critical, serious, and 
minor cybersecurity incidents. This variance seems 
related to the line of business, such as healthcare 
institutions rating illicit access to patient data as a more 
critical breach than would a retail company whose 
customer preferences were released, which might be a 
serious but not necessarily critical breach for that 
company. This, again, can help to build meaningful 
predictive models for particular businesses or industry 
sectors.   
 Overall, this research is an important step toward 
understanding the many ways that organizations may 
define cybersecurity success, as well as to enact 
effectiveness through knowledge application within 
their cyber governance systems. Our framework of the 
success of cybersecurity governance systems, although 
preliminary, provides rich grounds for further research 
in this area. These research efforts can assess the 
validity of our preliminary cybersecurity success 
dimensions, refining connecting success outcomes to 
particular knowledge domains, structural alignments, 
and organizational practices.  
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